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Abstract 
This first essay empirically tests the Peltzman Effect utilizing a unique dataset that is 
used to investigate the behavior of Formula One racecar drivers. The race-level dataset was 
culled from various sources and includes detailed information from a total of 547 Formula One 
races. A fixed effects model is used to determine whether or not Formula One racecar drivers 
alter their behavior in response to changes in the conditional probability of a casualty given an 
accident.  The empirical estimates support economic theory; Formula One racecar drivers 
become more reckless as their cars become safer, ceteris paribus.   Furthermore, the behavioral 
response of drivers is larger when the analysis is confined to changes in the conditional 
probability of a fatality given an accident.  
The second essay utilizes data from the National Youth Survey to reevaluate key 
conclusions from Fair (1978).  This study supports some of Fair’s empirical findings; however, 
the estimates obtained from this research contradict Fair in several key ways.  For example, this 
paper finds that the coefficients of occupation and education are both statistically significant but 
the signs are opposite to those in Fair (1978).   An even more noteworthy contradiction is the 
negative relationship between years of marriage and infidelity; this suggests that marriage 
longevity is positively related to that of match quality of the relationship. Also included in these 
new specifications are independent variables that better control for individual heterogeneity, 
factors such as general health, race, and alcohol consumption.  
This essay presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between 
two rival parties using a Stackelberg game.  This study assumes that opposing parties have 
access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict.  Conditions are 
derived under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist 
indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), 
it is shown that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a 
peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases 
if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior 
in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing 
 
“At the time (the 1960s and 70s) the safety precautions weren't as sophisticated as they are 
nowadays. The tiniest driving mistake could be lethal.” 
Former Formula One Driver, Jacky Ickx 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Traditionally, economists have maintained that drivers will drive more recklessly as auto 
safety improves, ceteris paribus.  However, when it comes to observed offsetting behavior that 
drivers make in response to increased safety, the empirical research conducted by economists has 
been anything but conclusive.  There haven been numerous research papers published that have 
examined the notion of driver offsetting behavior, but since the evidence has been so mixed in 
the empirical literature, conditions are conducive for an additional study on the effects that safety 
regulation has on driver behavior.  This research investigates the behavior of Formula One 
racecar drivers. 
 The format of the paper is as follows: 2) literature review, 3) Formula One history, 4) 
model, 5) results, and section 6) concludes. 
  
2.  Literature Review 
 According to Graham and Garber (1984), there are two primary competing theoretical 
perspectives when investigating the effects of automobile safety regulation.  The first viewpoint 
is that of the rationalists; this is the framework that most economists assume in their analysis.  
The rationalist theory states that as cars become safer, drivers will become more reckless, ceteris 
paribus.   
The second primary viewpoint is that of the behaviorist perspective.  This perspective 
contends that drivers might even ignore the chance of injury from driving a car, “based on the 
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heuristic that when probabilities drop below some threshold, they are treated as if they are zero.”  
Likewise, the engineer assumes that driver behavior will not be affected by improvements in 
safety.  The following literature review will primarily focus on the research done from the 
rationalist perspective as this is the prevailing view of economists, even though the empirical 
evidence is scant.   
The seminal study of the offsetting behavior of drivers was Peltzman (1975).  He used 
economic theory to explain how drivers are expected to change their behavior in response to 
automobile safety legislation.  According to Peltzman (1975), the approach taken by the non-
economic safety literature is to use “the probability of the accident as a datum, and seek only to 
measure how much the probability of surviving an accident is enhanced by a safety-device.” The 
wave of new safety regulations in the 1960s (spurred by Ralph Nader’s book Unsafe at Any 
Speed), could have changed the incentive to drive recklessly.  Peltzman (1975) further argues 
that “the mandatory installation of safety devices does not by itself change the private demand 
for safety, but it may change some relevant prices the response to which may mitigate some of 
the technological promise of these devices.”  Accordingly, when Peltzman (1975) uses both 
time-series and cross-section data, his results provide evidence that auto safety regulation did not 
affect the highway death rate.  His conclusion is that “safety regulation has decreased the risk of 
death from an accident by more than an unregulated market would have, but drivers have offset 
this by taking greater accident risk.”   
This paper spawned a host of other studies that all attempt to either support or dispel 
Peltzman’s findings.  The literature is quite mixed in its support of his original contribution.  
Robertson (1977) was the first extension of Peltzman’s original model.  He questioned the 
methodology of the latter when comparing actual death rates post-regulation with the projected 
death rates in the absence of regulation.  Peltzman used pre-regulation data to get these projected 
death rates.  Robertson (1977) tests the predictive power of the Peltzman model, and concludes 
the “projected rates progressively diverge from the actual rates . . . Therefore, projections . . . 
would be expected to diverge from actual rates in the absence of regulation.”  When Robertson 
adjusts the original model, the offsetting behavior of drivers seemingly disappears.   
 Peltzman (1977) replied that the original model was indeed robust to several 
specifications and that Robertson (1977) ignored the economic theory when using statistical 
analysis.  He also showed that Robertson’s adjustments lack any and all theoretical motivation; 
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thus, Peltzman concludes that Robertson, in effect, rigged the results in order to disprove the 
offsetting behavior hypothesis.  It should be noted that the data used by both authors is messy 
due to the aggregate nature of the real-world data.   
 In another study, Graham and Garber (1984) use the same data set as Peltzman (1975), 
but they changed the functional form from logarithmic to using the absolute levels of the 
variables.  Once this change was made, a much different conclusion was reached; the resulting 
estimates from Graham and Garber (1984) show “that regulation averted roughly 5,000 
casualties between 1966 and 1972, rather than causing about 10,000 deaths as Peltzman’s 
estimates suggest (Graham and Garber).”  Using their own model with a more descriptive set of 
independent variables, the author’s find that the government mandated safety equipment has 
saved tens of thousands of lives.  However, it is noted that their model did not test for any 
offsetting driver effects.   
Crandall and Graham (1984) use a simultaneous equation model to further explore what 
can be called the Peltzman Effect.  They explain that a primary data concern exists because it is 
difficult to find an accurate measure for the key independent variable, namely, the degree of 
crashworthiness required by federal regulation.   In order to find a better measure, they employ 
two different proxy variables for their estimation.  The first is the proportion of miles driven by 
cars built since federal automobile safety regulation began in 1968, while the second proxy is a 
weighted measure of such miles where the weights reflect estimates of improved occupant 
protection built into successive post-1965 model cars.  The estimates for the two proxies show 
some offsetting behavior, but not enough to reach the levels that Peltzman showed in his seminal 
work.  However, they admitted that their proxy variables were still not very precise.  
Another study that gives indirect evidence of the efficacy of auto safety regulation is 
Crandall et al. (1984).  They show that the implementation of required safety features does not 
specifically change the average total cost of automobiles.   However, the authors note that this 
finding of insignificance could stem from a poor measure of safety constraint from their model.    
In their survey of the automobile safety literature, Lund and O’Neill (1986) claim that the 
non-economic safety literature has almost uniformly denied the existence of risk compensation; 
one exception was the Rumar et al. (1976) study that found Swedish equipped studded tires on 
their autos increased their speed around snow covered turns in the road.  Further, they remind us 
again that post-Peltzman economic studies have failed to find offsetting behavior as well.  The 
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literature review concludes by purporting a seemingly behaviorist viewpoint that “people should 
be encouraged to reduce their risk of injury by supporting effective injury reducing measures.”   
Following this literature review, a series of economic studies from the early 1990s found 
partially offsetting effects while one study concluded that effects were completely offsetting.  
The following is a description of these studies. 
Evans and Graham (1991) use a fixed-effects model to estimate the effects of United 
States seat-belt regulation.  They cite survey data that suggests seat-belt usage went up as state-
law required their use; “In all states with such laws, usage rates increased rapidly after the laws 
became effective, with the average increase being 28% (Evans and Graham).”   The authors 
present a rough estimate when the assumption of no offsetting behavior is made; they described 
that when belt-use rates increase by 25 to 50 percent and if the seat-belts are 40 to 50 percent 
effective when occupants are involved in a crash, then seat-belt laws can be expected to lower 
fatalities by 10 to 25 percent.  Their results using sophisticated analysis confirm the back of the 
envelope calculation.  The authors did find some evidence confirming offsetting behavior in that 
non-occupant fatalities increased when states adopted seat-belt laws.  However, the authors 
contend that “the estimated number of lives lost due to non-occupant collisions . . . is swamped 
by the lifesaving effects for occupants.”  This study upholds the notion that seat-belt laws save 
lives, at least in the short-run.  They added by saying that in the long-run, there might be 
additional compensatory behavior as drivers might need time to fully adjust their behavior.    
A study by Chirinko and Harper (1993) partially supports the conclusions of Peltzman.  
The paper finds that drivers partially off-set the intended effects of safety regulation.  Accident 
rates were found to increase with safety-legislation and also pedestrian fatalities increased as 
well; however, in the aggregate, the authors found that the auto safety regulation decreased the 
total number of fatalities by 16.2 percent (which is much smaller than if there were no offsetting 
effects).   Conversely, Risa (1994) using data from Norway, supported Peltzman’s findings of 
totally offsetting behavior.  She found that there was such a large increase in accidents due to 
seat-belt regulation, that this legislation actually caused the total number of fatalities to increase.  
This is the only post-Peltzman study that finds a completely offsetting effect.  Meanwhile, Loeb 
(1995) found that seatbelt laws in Texas reduced injury rates, but the model did not test for any 
offsetting effects.   
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In a study that analyzed personal injury loss data from the insurance industry, Hoffer and 
Millner (1995) find that during the years 1990-1993, autos that were newly equipped with 
airbags were more expensive to fix after accidents.  Using another data set, the same authors also 
fin that “drivers of air-bag-equipped cars initiate an unusually large percentage of such crashes.”  
They conclude that drivers of cars with air-bags drive more recklessly, ceteris paribus. 
This concludes a description of studies that use “real-world” accident data to test for 
offsetting effects.  Recently, researchers have begun testing for the effects of safety regulation by 
turning to a more artificial form of auto-driving, that of racecars.  O’Roark and Wood (2004) 
investigate the effect of restrictor plates on safety in NASCAR.  Restrictor plates are a device 
that limits the speed engines can generate and were designed to reduce the number of serious 
accidents in races.  Using OLS, the authors find that the number of accidents increased when 
restrictor plates were used; this result is consistent with the offsetting behavior hypothesis.  
However, when the researchers use an ordered probit model to investigate the effect that 
restrictor plates had on safety, “there was no systematic evidence that they have led to more 
driver injuries.”   Reducing the speed of the racecars did not seem to decrease the likelihood of 
driver injury. 
 Using a more sophisticated approach, Sobel and Nesbit (2007) are able to test 
directly for offsetting effects in NASCAR.  Rather than use a dummy variable approach as 
O’Rourk and Wood (2004) did to test for the implementation of “safety” features, Sobel and 
Nesbit used an innovative moving average variable to account for driver’s perception of the 
conditional probability of being injured in a wreck.  Using a fixed effects approach, the authors 
found that there is an inverse relationship between the conditional probability of being injured 
and the number of accidents.   However, the effects were not completely offsetting. 
 This paper uses the same methodology as Sobel and Nesbit, but utilizes accident 
data from a sport that researchers have previously ignored, Formula One racing. 
 
3.  The History Formula One Racing 
The Formula One World Championship was formed in 1950 in order to bring the world’s 
best racing teams and drivers to compete in the most respected races.  Each subsequent year has 
continued this tradition that began in 1950.  Formula one racing is believed to attract the best 
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racecar drivers in the world.  The majority of races are held in Europe, but individual races have 
been held on every continent except for Antarctica. 
Since speeds often exceed 200 km/hr while racing on asymmetric courses, formula one 
racing is also one of the most dangerous sports in the world.  From the years 1950-1996, there 
were 54 injuries and 20 deaths in Formula One races.  Since the total number of events equaled 
597, the number of serious accidents per race is quite significant.  Do Formula One drivers take 
this danger into account when they race or do they potentially ignore the chance of serious injury 
as the behaviorist community suggest? 
In the 1960s, in response to high levels of injuries and deaths per accident, Formula One 
drivers campaigned to improve the safety of their race cars.  Since then, the safety of cars has 
improved dramatically.  The website f1technical.net provides a comprehensive listing of the 
safety changes made over the years in Formula One racing.  These changes in safety range from 
better racing helmets to fuel tank safety foam.   
Stirling Moss, a driver in the early years of Formula One said, “I would rather lose a race 
driving fast enough to win it than win one driving slow enough to lose it.”  This sort of attitude 
from racecar drivers implies that winning comes before safety.  However, social scientists are 
trained to place more weight on what individuals do in all situations rather than what they say.   
This paper intends to answer the following question with a unique data set: do Formula 
One drivers alter their behavior when racing becomes safer or do they ignore such incentives?  
This paper is the first attempt to answer this important question. 
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4. The Model 
 The most simplified form of the model similar to Peltzman (1975) and Sobel and 
Nesbit (2007) is: 
!AC =       (1) 
Where C  is the number of casualties, A is the number of accidents, and !  is the 
conditional probability of casualty given an accident.  When safety regulation is implemented 
that increases automobile safety, the variable !  will necessarily decrease. Generally when this 
occurs, the regulatory commission that implemented the change will claim victory.  For example, 
the FIA
1
 Deputy Vice President says, “Preventing accidents is not always possible but 
minimizing the consequences of an accident is fundamental to the FIA institute’s approach.”  
This quote demonstrates anecdotally that the FIA will focus on making the !  smaller while at 
the same time accepting the A  term as given.  Thus, the FIA might be ignoring the fact 
that!will increase as ! decreases; if the former increases by enough, then the number of 
casualties will actually increase as a result of safer cars.   
As in Sobel and Nesbit (2007), taking the total derivative of equation (1) produces: 
!!
!
! dddC "+
#
"#
=       (2) 
This simplifies to: 
!+
"
!"
=
#
#
#d
dC
     (3) 
 
 This equation represents the change of casualties in response to a change in the 
conditional probability of being injured in an accident.  Values for !  and ! are given in the 
summary statistics in the Appendix and both will obviously be positive.  Theory implies that 
0<
!
"!
#
and this hypothesis will be tested by using econometric techniques on a Formula One 
                                                
1
 FIAinstitute.com states, “the objective of the FIA institute is to promote improvements in the 
safety of motorsport”. 
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racing data set.  If the hypothesis is confirmed, and if the absolute value of 
!"
#"
is large enough, 
then the “offsetting” behavior of drivers will be large enough to completely reverse the intended 
consequences of the FIA’s safety regulation. 
 
4.  Data and Estimation 
The data set was collected from two internet sources.  The chief source was 
Grandprix.com, which is the official supplier of the motorsport database to the FIA.  This 
website has information on each Formula One race since 1950. A supplementary source was 
f1dp.com and is formally called the Formula One Database.  Information was culled from each 
race since the records were kept until 1996. Cross-checking the sources revealed that they are 
consistent with each other.  Data were collected from the years 1950-1996 and the race-level data 
set consists of 537 observations (each race is counted as one observation).  The reporting of the 
data changed after the 1996 season; this is why the dataset does not continue past this year.   The 
season-level data set consists of 46 observations although only 36 of them are of use for reasons 
discussed below.  This data set is able to control for many factors that the street-level data is not 
able to (for example rain is controlled for); I test how similar drivers on similar tracks respond to 
incentives.  It is now conceivable that ceteris paribus relationships of key economic variables 
can be analyzed.
2
   
 The formal econometric model is as follows: 
!"#"" +++= XAccidents
ii 321
     (4) 
More specifically, the dependent variable is actually the percentage of cars eliminated from 
the race due to being in an accident.
3
  For race-level estimation, this variable is computed as 
follows: 
i
i
i
raceincarsofQuantity
raceinaccidentsofQuantity
Accidents
____
____
=    (5) 
                                                
2
 As in Sobel and Nesbit (2007), time subscripts are not used since time is not part of this type of 
panel regression. 
3
 Cars leave races for a variety of reasons including accidents, mechanical failure, 
disqualification due to rules violation, etc.  Note: 
2
! is equivalent to 
.!"
"A
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The independent variable of interest is ! ; it is a moving average variable computed in the 
following manner: 
!
!
!
!
"
#
$
$
$
$
%
&
=
'
'
=
(
(=
n-i
1-it
j
1
j
Accidents
Casualties
ni
it
i
)  , where4      (6) 
2))(1(
E
z
yyn !=        (7) 
Where y  is the probability of a casualty conditional on being in an accident over all of 
the observations, z  is the standard normal value for a confidence interval (with 95% 
confidence).  E  is the maximum allowable error which is equal to 5%.
5
  t  chronologically 
orders the races through time.  Essentially, the variable !  utilizes information from the previous 
n  races over time and serves as a proxy for the safety of automobiles on race day i . Since the 
first observation of !  necessarily requires information from the previous 70 races, the dataset is 
narrowed from 597 to 527 observations, so the earliest observation occurs in the year 1958. 
X  includes the following control variables: cars per kilometer of track, speed of the 
fastest lap, a dummy variable for rain, starting position of the winner, number of lead changes, 
and track.  The econometric regressions use a fixed effects approach that control for the 
individual race-tracks. 
Our priors suggest that all of the control variables will be positively related to the 
dependent variable.  The reasoning for these priors follows.  Cars per kilometer will be positively 
related to the number of accidents since a higher density of cars increases the likelihood of 
incident; this result follows generally for driving in the real-world.  Speed will be related 
positively to the dependent variable because other things equal, faster speeds diminish the 
reaction time for drivers to avoid threatening situations.  Rain is expected to be positive for the 
same reasoning as the speed variable.  Lastly, the number of lead changes will be positively 
related the accident variable because more lead changes suggest a more competitive race 
environment that includes an increased number of wheel-to-wheel confrontations. 
                                                
4
 Casualties are defined as the sum of all race injuries and fatalities. 
5
 For the primary regression n=70. 
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The ! variable represents the perceived probability of casualty conditioned on being in 
an accident.   
An anecdotal example sheds light on the rationale of this variable: a retired Formula One 
driver said the following regarding safety conditions, “If you were a Formula one driver from 
1968-1973, chances are that you died.”  Since drivers are expected to drive more cautiously 
when the perceived probability of serious injury is high conditioned on being in an accident, one 
expects the accident rates over these years to be quite low.  This is precisely what the data show.  
Over the years 1968-1973, accident rates were among the lowest measured in the history of 
Formula One.
6
  With technological safety advances, accident rates began to climb.  Figure 1 
provides a nice representation of the correlation between yearly conditional probability of 
casualty and yearly accident rates.  Despite the negative relationship, a fixed effects model can 
provide further evidence of the causal relationship. 
 
5. Results 
 The regression results from table 1 show regression results from race-level data 
from the years 1958-1996.  Regressions 2-6 are the results from a fixed effects model where 
individual track effects are accounted for.  In each regression, the robust standard errors are 
provided, along with the level of statistical significance of each coefficient.  The dependent 
variable for Table 1 is the percentage of cars involved in accidents per race.  In all specifications, 
the coefficient of the independent variable of interest, ! , is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  This econometric result confirms the conclusion of the theoretical model; there 
is evidence of race-car drivers responding to changes in safety, ceteris paribus.  The size of this 
variable ranged from -0.46 to -0.60 when using the various FE specifications and all were both 
statistically and economically significant. 
The coefficient rain has the expected sign and is statistically significant.  The coefficients 
of speed, lead change, and starting position were not statistically different from zero.  The only 
unexpected result was that of the density variable; our prior was that the coefficient should be 
greater zero, but the regression results show a significant negative relationship between the 
                                                
6
 Part of the reason why racing was so dangerous before the mid-1970s was that the medical 
response system was so inefficient.   
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density of traffic on the track and the number of accidents.  One explanation for this result is that 
drivers will compensate for the dense conditions by driving more “safely”; thus, this could in fact 
be additional evidence for the compensating behavior of drivers. 
The R-squared for the FE specifications range in size from 0.21 to 0.24; the size of the R-
squared is standard for this sort of micro-level data. 
Table 3 has the same independent variables, but uses season level data instead.  The 
coefficients are all very similar to that of the race-level results.  The variable of interest is highly 
significant in each specification.  Since aggregate data is used in Table 3, the R-squared values 
are expected to be higher.  The R-squared ranges from 0.36 to 0.55 which is higher than the race-
level data.  The results for all the specifications are quite similar to those found by Sobel and 
Nesbit (2007) in their study of safety in NASCAR.  Since there is roughly a 2% chance of dying 
in a given accident, this unique data set gives us the possibility of investigating how drivers 
respond to changes in the conditional probability of death.  This variable is embedded in! , as 
deaths are a subset of casualties.  The correlation between conditional probability of death given 
an accident and accident rates is shown in Figure 2. 
Our priors suggest that the behavioral response will be larger with this new specification, 
since the average cost of dying is greater than the average cost of being a casualty victim.  The 
results confirm this conjecture.  The coefficient of the death variable is roughly twice the size as 
the coefficient of the !  variable.  Results are found in tables 3 and 4.  Except for the death 
coefficient, the estimates for the controls and the R-squared are economically the same as those 
from the first specification. 
Is the behavior completely offsetting?  The answer to this question is no.  According to 
the results, there is only partially offsetting behavior.   This means that as the probability of 
casualty or death decreases, the total number of casualties or deaths will decrease as well.  
However, the level of casualties is will be lower than predicted by an engineer or the FIA.   
Estimates use the season-level summary statistics from table 1. 
 Computation:  
From before: !+
"
!"
=
#
#
#d
dC
 
The values of ! and A are 7 and 10 respectively taken from the season-level summary 
statistics found in appendix 1.  The coefficient value of casualty rate from regression 4 in table 3 
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is used since this regression has the highest R-squared.  Now, values are substituted into the 
above equation: 
02.610)54.0(7 >=+!=
"d
dC
 
 Since 0>
!d
dC
, there is evidence for partially offsetting behavior of Formula One 
drivers in response to increased safety.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 This research has added to our knowledge of how drivers respond to incentives.  
Research using street-level data has not proved conclusive in showing offsetting behavior.  
However, this empirical investigation using a unique Formula One data set shows that drivers 
exhibit partially offsetting behavior.  This result reinforces the work done by Sobel and Nesbit 
(2007) and gives added empirical evidence in favor of the rationalist school of thought first 
rigorously proposed by Peltzman (1975).  
 Further, this is the first paper to show that a change in the conditional probability 
of driver death has a large impact on driving behavior.  This type of analysis was possible 
because of the high fatality rate in the sport (there was a death in about 4% of races).  Also, the 
response of driving behavior to changes in the death rate appears higher than the response to 
changes in the casualty rate.   
 Clearly, the safety changes that were made over the years in the sport have 
reduced both driver casualties and death, but the magnitude of the lives and limbs that have been 
saved is certainly smaller than what the FIA would claim.   Sobel and Nesbit first proposed that 
racecar drivers are necessarily more risk loving than the average citizens
7
; however, no research 
has been done to estimate the risk attitudes of racers compared to others.  Ascertaining whether 
or not racecar drivers respond in the same way to traditional drivers is important for policy 
considerations. Further research in this field is crucial in order to place more effective safety 
legislation in regards to everyday driving.  
                                                
7
 They cite research that shows theoretically that risk lovers will respond more to a change in 
driving conditions than will a risk-neutral or risk-averse individual. 
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Figure 1.1-  Correlation between accident and casualty rates 
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Figure 1.2-  Correlation between accident and death rates 
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Figure 1.3- Scatter plot of casualty rates and year 
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Figure 1.4- Scatter plot of accident rates and year 
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Table 1.1-   Summary Statistics for Race Level Data 
Variable  Mean Minimum  Maximum  Std. Deviation  
% of cars in an accident  10.3 0 61.9 9.7 
Conditional Probability of Casualty  6.2 0.4 17.7 4.7 
Conditional Probability of Death  1.8 0 6.9 2.1 
Cars per Km  5.6 0.57 11.4 1.9 
Speed of fastest lap  187.5 104.3 249.8 29.6  
Number of lead changes  2.23 0 40 3.4 
Starting Position  3.05 1 22 2.8 
Rain  0.14 0 1 0.35  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2-  Summary Statistics for Season Level Data 
Variable  Mean Minimum  Maximum  Std. Deviation  
% of cars in an accident  10.0 3 17.9 3.7 
Conditional Probability of Casualty  7.0 0.9 16.2 4.9 
Conditional Probability of Death  2.3 0 6.4 2.3 
Cars per Km  5.4 3.4 8.5 1.2 
Speed of fastest lap  186.0 165.5 203.1 8.9 
Number of lead changes  2.4 0.8 5.6 1.3 
Starting Position  3.1 1.6 5.3 0.9 
Rain  0.14 0 0.4 0.1 
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Table 1.3- OLS Race Level Regressions (fixed effects control for individual race tracks) 
Dependent Variable:  
i
Accidents
 
   (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)     (5)     (6)  
Casualty Rate  -0.42***  
(5.13)  
-0.46***  
(3.96)  
-0.46***  
(4.01)  
-0.60***  
(4.21)  
-0.54***  
(3.69)  
-0.51***  
(3.29)  
Rain     ---    ---  0.05***  
(3.12)  
0.05***  
(3.21)  
0.05***  
(3.22) 
0.05***  
(3.19)  
Density     ---    ---     ---  -0.01**  
(2.04)  
-0.01** 
(2.04)  
-0.01*  
(1.89)  
Speed     ---    ---     ---     --- 0.00 
(1.13)  
0.00 
(0.96)  
Starting Position     ---    ---     ---     ---    --- 0.00 
(1.35)  
Lead Changes     ---    ---      ---     ---    --- -0.00 
(0.23)  
Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.13***  
(18.23)  
0.04***  
(3.96)  
0.00*** 
(4.01)  
0.25***  
(8.46)  
0.10 
(1.47)  
0.08 
(1.19)  
R-Squared  .04 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 
All regressions use robust standard errors.  *** indica tes significance at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  Regression (1) does not control for track effects.  
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Table 1.4- OLS Season Level Regressions  
Dependent Variable:  RateAccidentYearly __
 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Casualty Rate  -0.45***  
(4.49)  
-0.46***  
(4.93)  
-0.61***  
(5.07)  
-0.54***  
(3.57)  
Rain    ----  0.10***  
(3.24)  
0.09***  
(2.85)  
0.08**  
(2.84)  
Density    ----    ----  -0.01* 
(1.73)  
-0.10***  
(3.05)  
Speed    ----    ----     ----  0.00 
(0.60)  
Lead Change    ----    ----     ----  -0.01  
(1.51)  
Starting Position    ----    ----     ----  0.01* 
(1.91)  
Constant  
 
0.13***  
(15.69)  
0.12***  
(13.89)  
0.18***  
(5.31)  
0.10 
(0.65)  
R-squared  0.36 0.44  0.48 0.55 
All regressio ns use robust standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.   
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Table 1.5-  OLS Race Level Regressions (fixed effects control for individual race tracks) 
Dependent Variable:  
i
Accidents
 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Death Rate  -0.90***  
(5.20)  
-1.00***  
(4.15)  
-1.00***  
(4.16)  
-1.31***  
(4.46)  
-1.14***  
(3.36)  
Rain     ----    ----  0.05***  
(3.15)  
0.05***  
(3.25)  
0.05***  
(3.15)  
Density     ----    ----     ----  -0.01**  
(2.15)  
-0.01* 
(1.94)  
Speed     ----    ----     ----    ----  0.00 
(0.71)  
Lead Change     ----    ----     ----    ----  -0.00 
(0.04)  
Starting Position     ---   ----     ----    ----  0.00 
(1.26)  
Track Effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.12***  
(20.86)  
0.11***  
(8.95)  
0.15***  
(157.13)  
0.24***  
(8.69)  
0.09 
(1.24)  
R-squared  0.04 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 
All regressions use robust standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  Regression (1) does not con trol for track effects.   
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Table 1.6-  OLS Season Level Regressions 
Dependent Variable:  RateAccidentYearly __
 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Death Rate  -0.94***  
(4.70)  
-0.97***  
(5.19)  
-1.51***  
(6.18)  
-1.37***  
(3.63)  
Rain    ----  0.10***  
(3.88)  
0.10***  
(3.53)  
0.09***  
(3.06)  
Density    ----    ----  -0.01***  
(2.94)  
-0.01***  
(3.17)  
Speed    ----    ----    ----  0.00 
(0.25)  
Lead Changes    ----    ----    ----  -0.00  
(0.65)  
Starting Position    ----    ----    ----  0.01 
(1.31)  
Constant  0.12***  
(18.19)  
0.11***  
(14.83)  
0.19***  
(6.50)  
0.14 
(0.82)  
R-squared  0.35 0.45  0.51 0.54 
All regressions u se robust standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.   
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CHAPTER 2 - The Economics of Cheating: A Reexamination of 
Fair’s Model of Infidelity 
1. Introduction and Literature Review 
This is a study of the demand for a particular type of leisure good, extramarital affairs.  It 
is a widely held belief by economists that the study of economics can shed light on a variety of 
social phenomena; therefore, it is not surprising that economists have studied marital infidelity.  
The seminal work in this area was published in the prestigious Journal of Political Economy by 
Ray Fair in 1978.   
 His research presents an economic model that explains the allocation between two 
types of leisure goods: time spent with the spouse, and time spent with paramour.  His 
motivation for the research is that an individual values a variety of goods in their lives.  This 
notion is hardly new for economists since there is usually more than one type of good in the 
utility function in classical demand theory.  As such, it is not difficult to argue that individuals 
prefer a variety of leisure activities.   
Fair tests the theory by using a modern econometric model by utilizing two distinct 
datasets.  The first dataset is from Psychology Today while the second dataset is from the 
magazine Redbook.  The dependent variable from the PT dataset is the answer to the question, 
“how often engaged in extramarital sexual intercourse during the past year?”  It is a left-censored 
variable since many observations of the independent variable are zero. This leads Fair to utilize a 
Tobit model.  Independent variables include: sex, age, number of years married, children, how 
religious, level of education, occupation, and marital happiness.  
The chief problem with the data is that they were collected using mail-in surveys so the 
sample could be biased.  Fair concedes that there is a problem with the data and suggests that his 
results are “good enough to warrant further tests of the model in the future if more data become 
available.”  Thus, promising new research in this area is possible by using a better dataset to 
empirically test key theoretical results. 
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 An extremely rich dataset that includes all of the necessary variables is the 
National Youth Survey (United States), 1987 Wave VII.   The data was collected by using 
standard probability sampling techniques.   Another desirable attribute of the data is that it 
includes key variables that Fair did not have access to, such as individual wages and spousal 
income.  After a review of the literature, I have concluded that economists after Fair (1978) have 
only used the Psychology Today and Redbook datasets in conducting their research.  For 
example, Wells (2003) uses the Psychology Today data to support the results from Fair’s earlier 
research.  This will be the first paper that utilizes a superior dataset.  The goal for this research is 
to use a Tobit model in order to test the validity of Fair’s theory on extramarital affairs.   
2. The Theoretical Model 
 Fair’s model includes the following separable utility function: 
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UUU +=  where (*)1 fU = and (*)2 gU =    (1) 
Where 
1
U  is utility gained from the relationship with the spouse whereas 
2
U  is the utility 
gained from the relationship with the paramour. The agent is obviously subject to a time and 
budget constraint.  The decision problem for agent i is solved in the standard way by setting up a 
Lagrangian.  The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the effects of exogenous 
variables on time spent with the paramour.   
  ),,,(),,,( 222111 ExttgExttfU ps +=      (2) 
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 The budget constraint for agent i  is as follows: 
 0)()( 2121 =+!+!! ii xxpVttTw    
Where, 
1
t  is time spent with spouse, 
2
t is time spent with paramour, :
3
t  is time spent 
working, 
s
t  is time spent by spouse in the relationship, 
p
t  time spent by paramour in the 
relationship, T  is total time,
1
x  is total units of the good consumed in the relationship with the 
spouse,
2
x is total units of the good consumed in the relationship with the paramour,
i
x
1
is unit of 
the good provided by agent i in the relationship with the spouse,
i
x
2
 is units of the good 
provided by agent i in the relationship with the paramour, sx1  is units of the good provided by the 
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spouse, 
p
x
2
 is units of the good provided by the paramour, 
1
E  is taken to include all variables 
that impact the utility of being with the spouse, 
2
E  is taken to include all variables that impact 
the utility of being with the paramour, w  is the wage rate, V is non-labor income, p is the price 
of the goods that agent i supplies. 
 
The problem is solved in the usual way by setting up the Lagrangian: 
  )]xx(pV)ttT(w[UL ii 2121 +!+!!"+=     (3) 
 The choice variables for agent i are as follows: ,,, 121 xtt and 2x .  The remainder of 
the variables are taken by the agent as exogenous.  This particular model is strong in the sense 
that the spouse will exhibit the same behavior regardless of the time spent with the paramour.  
Relaxing this assumption could be an area for future research.   
 The agent maximizes the Lagrangian subject to the above budget constraint.  The 
theory will be linked to the empirical section by tracing the change of 
2
t in response to changes 
in key exogenous variables.  Thus, we are interested in several comparative static partial 
derivatives: 
 
Table 2.1- Theoretical Predictions 
 
 
 Derivative  Theoretical Sign  
(1.1)  
1
2
dE
dt
 
Negative  
(1.2)  
2
 
Ambiguous (but likely positive)  
(1.3)  
s
x1
 
Negative  
(1.4)  
w
t2
 
Ambiguous (depending on income and substitution effec ts)  
 
3. Data and the Econometric Model 
  Previously ignored variables were discovered in the National Youth Survey, 
wave 1987.  This dataset includes the response to survey questions in regards to many aspects of 
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life.  All respondents during this wave were between the ages of 21-28; thus, many of the 
respondents were married.   Out of the 1,725 respondents, 553 were married and living with their 
spouse and will be the relevant population for this study. Why has this dataset been completely 
ignored in terms of research into extramarital affairs? The most likely reason is that there are no 
specific questions such as: “Have you had an affair?”  The absence of this particular question 
might well have thrown off previous researchers.  However, the survey does ask questions such 
as: “How often have you slept with your spouse in the past year?” and “How often have you 
slept with someone that was not your spouse in the past year?”   
 If all the respondents had been faithful to their spouses, the answers to these 
questions would be mutually exclusive; however, as expected, many respondents had slept with 
their spouse and somebody else during the previous year, this “somebody else” is what Fair 
defined as a paramour.  Therefore, the definition for engaging in an extramarital affair will be the 
following: 
a. Currently Married. 
b. Living with the Spouse (i.e. was not separated when engaging with paramour). 
c. Sexual relations (at least once) with a paramour during the past year. 
Roughly ten percent of the sample satisfy the above three criteria.   The variable chosen to 
represent the theoretical variable, 
s
t , will be rateAffair _ .  Survey respondents were asked 
specifically the rate of sexual encounters with the paramour.  Their answers are coded in the 
following manner found in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2- Description of Dependent Variable 
 
rateAffair _
 Value of Dependent 
Variable  
No affair   0 
1-3 encounters for the year  1 
4-9 encounters for the year  2 
Once a month  3 
Once every 2 -3 weeks  4 
Once every week  5 
Two or Three times a 
week 
6 
Once a day  7 
 
 
The dependent variable is quite similar to that of Fair’s.  It is obvious that rateAffair _ will 
be correlated with the theoretical term 
s
t . 
The general form of the full Tobit model is given by: 
!"""""
"""""
++++++
++++=
AgeMarriedYearsMalesligiousnesKids
onSatisfactiMaritalOccupationSpouseEducationOccupationrateAffair
98765
43210
_Re
___
 
Obviously, since measures of occupation were needed for many of the regressions, non-
employed individuals were necessarily removed from the sample.
8
  The above variables will now 
be described. 
Occupation  was derived from the Hollingshead index in reverse order.  Essentially, the 
Occupation  variable measures social status from 1-7 with a 7 being the highest social status 
possible (see Table 2.5 for a description).  This measure is positively correlated with education 
and Fair hypothesized that it was also positively correlated with wages.  The expected sign of the 
coefficient 
1
!  is therefore ambiguous. 
 As in Fair,Education  is equal to 9 if the individual was a high school dropout, 12 
if they only completed high school, 14 if they did some college work, 16 if they graduated with a 
                                                
8
 This will reduce the relevant sample size to 434. 
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college degree, and 17 if they did some post-graduate work.   This variable is also correlated 
with wages so the expected coefficient of Education is also ambiguous. 
 OccupationSpouse_  is similar to that of Occupation , the only difference is that 
it measures the socio-economic status of the respondent’s spouse (only one regression includes 
this variable).  The coefficient for this variable is expected to be negative. 
The variable onSatisfactiSpouse_ was taken from a list of six questions that ranged from 
“How satisfied are you with your spouse?” to “How much do you have in common with your 
spouse?”  Each answer ranged from 1-5, with the value of 5 rating the spouse in the most 
favorable way.  The six measures were summed and divided by six in order to obtain an average.  
This hopefully serves as a more accurate measure of overall satisfaction in comparison with the 
answer to a single question.  Obviously, the coefficient of onsatisfactiSpouse_  is expected to be 
negative since the variable is positively correlated with 
1
E . 
Kids is a dummy variable equal to one when the respondent reported having at least one 
child and the coefficient of this variable is also expected to be negative.   
The variable essreligiousn  is used to measure how religious an individual is. Each 
respondent answered the following two questions.  1) “During the past year, how often did you 
attend religious services?” An answer of 5 indicates the individual attended a religious service 
several times a week. 2) “How important has religion been in your life?” An answer 5 indicates 
that religion is very important to them.  The average of the answers to the above questions is 
used for the variable, essreligiousn .  The coefficient of essreligiousn is expected to be negative 
since a highly religiousness individual will presumably derive less utility from ending the 
marriage, ceteris paribus.  Male is a dummy variable and is equal to one when the respondent 
reported being a male.  The sign of this coefficient is ambiguous using Fair’s model.  
The edyearsmarri variable is calculated as the number of years since marriage for the 
respondent.  This is perhaps the most controversial variable in Fair’s original article; he 
hypothesizes that the coefficient of edyearsmarri , 
8
! , will be positive.  His explanation is that 
the longer an individual is married and remains monogamous, the more the utility he/she will get 
from introducing “variety” into life.  This is analogous to saying that the more years somebody 
only eats vanilla ice cream, the utility they receive from trying a different flavor will necessarily 
increase. An alternative explanation is that marriage longevity will be negatively related with the 
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number of affairs since it is a signal of match quality.   Fair’s findings support his own 
hypothesis that the coefficient of this variable to be positive. However, Li and Racine (2004) 
using non-parametric techniques, find that the number of years married is simply not a predictor 
of having an extramarital affair.   In order to correctly identify how long individuals have been 
married, those that describe themselves as remarried are necessarily dropped from this data set. 
 
Table 2.3- Expected correlation between theortical and empirical exogenous variables 
Theoretical Variable Correlated With (Sign) 
Occupation w (positive) 
Education w (positive) 
Spouse Occupation 
s
x
1
(positive) 
Marital Happiness 
1
E  (positive) 
Age None 
Years Married 
1
E  (ambiguous) 
Children 
1
E  (positive) 
Religiousness 
2
E  (negative) 
Male None 
 
4.  Results  
Since the age group of the National Youth Survey was quite homogenous when 
compared to the Psychology Today and Redbook surveys that Fair utilized, the relevance of 
including an age variable in the regression was not immediately clear.  Table A.2 in the 
appendix, includes the regressions with and without the age variable.  Clearly, the results 
indicate that age still matters even though the NYS dataset only includes individuals in their 
twenties.  This result is surprising since the sexual functioning of adults in their twenties is 
seemingly quite constant.   
The similarities of the replication and Fair’s study are numerous.  First, the marital 
happiness coefficient is identical in sign to the original study and also matches the theory.  Also 
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in agreement is the degree of religiosity; these coefficients are statistically significant and 
negative as theory predicts.  These results hold for each of the regressions in this paper. 
There are some disagreements across studies, however. First, the male variable was larger 
and much more significant across most of my regressions than it was in Fair’s paper.  It is well-
documented that men cheat on average more than women, and my estimations provide support 
that this social phenomenon holds even when controlling for sundry other factors.  However, if 
more factors are controlled for, the coefficient might conceivably grow smaller and less 
significant. 
Even more troubling is the disagreement between occupational status and educational 
attainment.  Both should theoretically have the same sign (since they are both positively 
correlated with the wage rate); however, this is not the case as seen in table A.2.  Even more 
troubling is the fact that Fair and this study are in complete disagreement as to the signs of the 
coefficients; for example, occupational status is negative with the NYS data and positive in 
Fair’s study.  Immediate economic explanations for the signs of these variables are not readily 
available.   
The length of marriage also contradicts Fair’s research.  He found that years married will 
be positively correlated with the dependent variable.  In the estimation of the NYS data, the 
coefficient of this variable is negative and is significant at the one percent level in most 
specifications.  This is a very important finding since the NYS data was collected using 
statistically valid sampling techniques while Fair’s data was collected from mail-in surveys.  
Thus, perhaps it is likely the Fair data previously used could have been biased in some way. 
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Table 2.4-  A Comparison of Empirical Results 
Variable  NYS 
Results  
Fair’s Results  Empirical 
Agreement  
Occupation  Negative  Positive  No 
Education  Positive  Negative  No 
Marital 
Satisfaction  
Negative  Negative  Yes 
Age Negative  (statistically 
insignificant)  
Negative  Yes 
Kids  Negative  Negative  Yes 
Relig ion  Negative  Negative  Yes 
Male  Positive  Positive (statistically 
insignificant)  
Yes 
Years Married  Negative  Positive  No 
 
 
The NYS dataset provides two variables that were not available to Fair, wages and 
spousal income.  Wage is one of the most crucial variables of his theoretical model, but as seen 
previously, the proxy variables for wage are not consistent with each other.  Thus, having a true 
measure for wage is conceivably a large contribution to the literature.    
The Tobit model is specified as follows: 
!"### +$+++= meSpouseIncowagerateAffair 210_  
Where wage  is the respondent’s reported hourly wage rate in at their primary job during 
1986 (reported in 1986 dollars).   meSpouseInco  is the respondent’s answer to the total amount 
of income earned by their spouses in 1986.  ! is a matrix of control variables that is similar to 
the controls used in the regressions during the previous section.   
The results of the regressions found in table A.3 are a better representation of Fair’s ideal 
variables.  These key variables are wages, spousal income, and spousal occupation.  The 
theoretical prediction of the wage coefficient is ambiguous according to Fair’s model.   
Meanwhile, the coefficients of spousal income and spousal occupation are expected to be 
negative since there is a likely positive relationship with the theoretical value, 
1
E .  Interestingly, 
all of these variables are statistically insignificant as found in table A.3.  
 Including wages does not alter the signs or magnitude of the other coefficients and is not 
different from zero.  Adding this theoretically important variable does not add much to the 
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empirical investigation.  The same is true for spousal income and spousal occupation.  
Additionally, the Pseduo-R2s are smaller than those in the first set of regressions 
The signs and magnitude of the variables in the !  matrix are very robust to model 
specification.  So in light of these findings, perhaps alternative theoretical and empirical models 
should be considered in future studies of marital infidelity.   
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5.  Conclusion 
Fair’s (1978) model of an individual’s decision to “betray” their spouse describes marital 
happiness as one of the key exogenous variables that will affect ones decision to “cheat.”  Fair 
describes the value of marital happiness as having a causal effect on the amount of cheating.  The 
results from this research confirm this result and others such as degree of religiousness. 
However, the empirical estimates of this study contradict Fair’s study in several key 
ways.  For example, this paper finds that the coefficients of occupation and education are both 
statistically significant but the signs are the opposite of those in the original study by Fair.  Even 
more noteworthy is the negative relationship between years of marriage and infidelity; this result 
suggests that marriage longevity is positively related to that of match quality of the relationship.  
Fair had suggested that a positive relationship is expected between marriage longevity and 
infidelity since the marginal utility of cheating will increase the longer one remains 
monogamous.  Also, payout from divorce settlement increases with length of marrage. 
As stated before, it is certain from this and former research that marital satisfaction is 
negatively related with the number of affairs.  However, it is not clear whether individuals are 
having affairs because they are unhappy with their spouse, unhappy in general with their lives, or 
a combination of the two.  This paper only tested for the former; which can be called the marital 
satisfaction effect.  
Sociologists, such as Glenn and Weaver (1981), contend that marital happiness is 
positively correlated with global/overall happiness.  However, there are many other determinants 
that also influence an individual’s global happiness such as health.  One key question concerns 
what factors of happiness will be related to the decision to have an extramarital affair.  
Intuitively, marital happiness is an easy choice as a factor that will be associated an individual’s 
decision to have an affair.  
However, it might not be immediately clear whether or not other determinants of well-
being will be positively or negatively related with the decision to cheat. For a factor such as 
general health, it is quite conceivable that this will have a negative effect on the decision to 
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cheat
9
.   For example, Halpern et al. (1999) found that young women with higher body fat counts 
were less likely to date.  Thus, unhappiness as a result of poor health might decrease the 
likelihood of cheating.   
It is likely that the previous literature regarding extramarital affairs has not examined data 
sources rich enough to fully address the complexities of the situation.  A natural extension from 
this research is to find variables that can account for heterogeneity across individuals, 
particularly concerning characteristics that might be correlated with engaging in extramarital 
affairs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9
 Hence, if an individual is unhappy because they are overweight, we might expect them to be 
less eager to cheat because it might be more difficult for them to go on a date, ceteris paribus. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.5-  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation  
Occupation  434 3.59  1.52  
Education  434 13.06  2.01  
Wage  434 7.40  4.01  
Spouse Occupation  386 3.52  1.55  
Marital Satisfaction  434 4.21  0.52  
Kids  434 0.62  0.49  
Religion  434 3.09  1.13  
Male  434 0.49  0.50  
Age 434 24.29  1.89  
Spouse Income (in thousands)  429 13.98  10.77  
Years Married  434 3.79  2.29  
Affair_rate  434 0.29  1.04  
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Table 2.6- Hollingshead Index 
Code Occupation 
1 Unskilled 
2 Machine operators, semi-skilled 
3 Skilled manual 
4 Clerical and sales, technician, etc. 
5 Administrative personnel, etc. 
6 Business manager, etc. 
7 Higher executive, major professional, etc. 
 
 
Table 2.7- A Replication of Fair’s Estimation by Utilizing NYS Data 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  
Constant  5.91** 
(1.73)  
10.35**  
(1.88)  
8.72 
(1.38)  
Occupation  -0.49**  
(1.79)  
-0.45**  
(1.67)  
-0.40 
(1.32)  
Education  0.19 
(1.01)  
0.25 
(1.25)  
0.32 
(1.41)  
Spouse 
Occupation  
-----  -----  -0.24 
(0.79)  
Marital 
Satisfaction  
-1.76***  
(2.72)  
-1.78***  
(2.76)  
-1.83**  
(2.40)  
Kids  -0.46 
(0.57)  
-0.45  
(0.56)  
-0.39 
(0.43)  
Religiousness  -1.14***  
(3.11)  
-1.13***  
(3.09)  
-1.13***  
(2.76)  
Male  1.12* 
(1.52)  
1.21* 
(1.63)  
1.23*  
(1.49)  
Years Married  -0.50***  
(2.78)  
-0.42**  
(2.15)  
-0.55**  
(2.37)  
Age -----  -0.23  
(1.04)  
-0.16 
(0.63)  
Observations  434 434 381 
LR- Chi squared  42.45 43.54 37.89  
Pseduo -R2 0.0851 0.0873  0.0872  
t-statistics are in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 2.8-  Regressions that Include More of Fair’s Ideal Variables 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  
Wage  -0.04 
(0.43)  
-0.02 
(0.18)  
-0.04 
(0.29)  
Marital Satisfaction  -1.70***  
(2.62)  
-1.71***  
(2.59)  
-1.70**  
(2.18)  
Kids  -0.44 
(0.55)  
-0.52 
(0.63)  
-0.53 
(0.59)  
Religiousness  -1.11***  
(3.07)  
-1.11***  
(3.03)  
-1.10***  
(2.65)  
Male  1.31*  
(1.72) 
1.09 
(1.19)  
1.18  
(1.19)  
Years Married  -0.43** 
(2.22)  
-0.40**  
(2.07)  
-0.53**  
(2.23)  
Age -0.20 
(0.96)  
-0.27 
(1.19)  
-0.16 
(0.62)  
Spouse Income  ------  -0.012  
(0.28)  
-.009 
(0.17)  
Spouse Occupation  ------  ------  -0.20 
(0.63)  
Constant  11.26**  
(2.01)  
12.84**  
(2.20)  
11.23*  
(1.67)  
Observations  434 424 371 
LR- Chi squared  40.53  39.40 33.88  
Pseudo -R2 0.0813  0.0805  0.0796  
t-statistics are in parenthesis. **** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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CHAPTER 3 - The Fate of Disputed Territories: An Economic 
Analysis 
1.  Introduction 
 As evidenced by our ever-changing political maps, situations often arise in which two 
parties or groups fight over a disputed territory.  A party can value land not only for economic 
reasons, but also on intrinsic grounds, as in the case of India and Pakistan’s dispute over the 
border regions Jammu and Kashmir.  It is easy to see how competing parties might prize a piece 
of land that bears cultural significance or one that is rich in some scarce resource.  However, 
attempts by a challenger to take the land from its possessor are costly.  Under what 
circumstances, then, will the challenger attack?  To what degree does the defending party arm 
itself in preparation for possible attack?  Lastly, when might a dispute end and peace be 
everlasting? 
Social scientists have observed that territorial disputes are the primary cause of war 
(Goetz and Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993; Kocs 1995; Forsberg 1996; Huth 1996).  Although the 
specific roots of conflict over territory vary from one land to another, they are directly related to 
a territory’s economic value, nationalist value, or both (Huth 1996; Wiegand 2004).  Moreover, it 
has been noted that territorial disputes vary significantly with respect to duration and outcome, 
suggesting that many factors characterize the fate of a disputed territory (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Fearon 2004; Hegre 2004). 
Focusing on territorial disputes, we present a simple game-theoretic model of conflict to 
identify possible factors that determine the effective deterrence of a challenger by the territory’s 
possessor.  Methodologically, we follow Gershenson and Grossman (2000) and use a one-period 
repeated game where each party is myopic.
1
  Although their model is one-period (or static) in 
nature, Gershenson and Grossman explain well why civil conflict may be never-ending in a 
period-to-period (or dynamic) framework of perpetual conflict.  However, our investigation of 
territorial conflict departs from their analysis of civil conflict in two important aspects.  These 
deviations allow us to offer a more complete analysis of territorial conflict. 
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First, Gershenson and Grossman use only a status parameter to characterize relative 
military spending effectiveness of each party.  Hence, a change in dominant party implies an 
inversion of the two parties’ relative military spending effectiveness.  As the paper states, “[t]his 
specification implies that both groups have access to the same technologies for challenging 
political dominance” (Gershenson and Grossman, 2000, p. 811).  We find this assumption too 
restrictive in the case of (civil or non-civil) territorial dispute.  If cultural and religious 
differences between opposing parties can persist, why cannot differences in level of military 
human capital, for instance, do the same?  In the case of the United States Civil War, the talent of 
the Union Army generals is generally recognized as inferior to that of the Confederacy (Wells, 
1922).  When the Union recaptured the Confederacy, did the former party instantly enjoy the 
advantage of a superior set of generals by virtue of the fact that it had won?  Obviously, it did 
not.  After victory or defeat, therefore, it is important to allow for the possibility that two parties 
are innately different in terms of military effectiveness.
2
  By including an identity parameter that 
characterizes relative positional/strategic effectiveness, in addition to a status parameter that 
captures relative military effectiveness in the disputed territory, our model can address situations 
of territorial dispute.  The inclusion of this identity parameter allows us to conclude that 
territorial conflict between two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely (with land possession 
alternating stochastically) when parties have access to different technologies for challenging 
political dominance in a region. 
Second, we consider how destruction of economic resources affects the outcome of a 
conflict in land dispute.  Our model follows Gershenson and Grossman (2000) and Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2000) in employing an exogenous destruction term that is common to each party.
3 
 
Unlike Gershenson and Grossman, who implicitly set their exogenous destruction term equal to 
zero, we allow for destruction in a given conflict.  Relaxing this assumption permits us to 
examine the comparative static effects of exogenous changes in destruction on causes of war or 
peace.  The model suggests that, as the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the 
likelihood of a peaceful outcome improves given that the challenging party has relatively less 
intrinsic value for the land.
4
  Also, if war is to end, it may end more quickly (and will never end 
less quickly) as the nature of war becomes more destructive.  Lastly, assuming that war is 
exogenously destructive creates the possibility that a challenging party invades a territory but 
later withdraws due to reduced economic incentives to continue the attack.
5
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Additionally, so as not to allow our model’s applicability to be bound by political 
definitions, we broadly define the term disputed territory as any land valued by more than one 
party.  This definition allows us to consider the more general question of “Why are some 
territories not attacked?” 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops a simple 
Stackelberg framework of territorial dispute to characterize strategic interactions between two 
rival parties.  In the section, we discuss several scenarios of conflict and deterrence and derive 
the conditions under which war is endless in the absence of exogenous shock.  Section 3 
concludes.   
2.  The Model 
Following Gershenson and Grossman (2000), we adopt a “myopic” framework of conflict 
to characterize the outcome of territorial disputes from one period to another.
6
  We consider a 
two-party model in which Party A possesses a disputed territory initially and is prepared to incur 
costs to maintain possession, as Party B might attempt to take the land by force.  Consistent with 
the research questions offered in our opening paragraph, we would like to find conditions under 
which Party B fights for the land.  If fighting commences, we wish to determine under what 
circumstances it ceases.  To this end, we examine the following five collectively exhaustive 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1: Party A effectively deters Party B (there is no war).   
Scenario 2: Party A eventually deters Party B (there is war, but Party A deters Party B 
 without the land changing hands).   
Scenario 3: Party B fights, takes the land, and immediately deters Party A.   
 Scenario 4: Party B fights, takes the land, and eventually deters Party A.   
Scenario 5: Subsequent conflict (including the case where war is endless). 
Should disagreement over the disputed region lead to war (i.e., armed confrontation) 
between A and B in period ( ),i j+  each party is assumed to have a realized probability of victory 
(or contest success function) as follows: 
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as long as Party A is the leader, 7  where  ( 0)i ! =
the number of periods over which fighting occurs;  
( 0)j ! =
the number of periods over which there is no armed confrontation;  
" =
the military effectiveness  of Party A, an identity parameter;  
µ
the military effectiveness of Party B, an identity parameter ;  
= 
 positional or strategic effectiveness of the d efender in the disputed region, a status parameter;  
f =
positional or strategic effectiveness of the challenger in the disputed region,  a status  
       parameter;  
,A i jG +
units of military goods Party A has obtained to defend the disputed land; 8 
( 0)B i j ! =
units of milit ary goods Party B has obtained to challenge for the disputed land.   
It is easy to verify that the probability contest functions have the following properties:  
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 will differ as the land changes possession.  The 
contest success functions (CSFs) in (1) can be rewritten as  
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 is a ra tio comparing the “overall” (i.e., military and strategic) effectiveness  of 
Party B in attacking the disputed territory to that of Party A in defending the disputed territory.   
In addressing the disputed land situation, each party chooses to purchase a nu mber of 
guns that maximizes its expected payoff.  If Parties A and B are fighting in period 
( 0)i j+ !
, 
their payoffs in the next period are given respectively as  
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Equations (2a) and (2b) can be explained as follows: 
, 1T i jU + +  is Party T’s expected utility 
in time period 1i j+ +  (where T = (A, B), *( )i j N+ ! ),
9
 
,T i jE +  is Party T’s flow of endowment 
in period i, 
T
V  is the amount of intrinsic value Party T places on holding the land,
10
 ( !"1 ) 
represents the destruction rate of the land’s economic value with each period of fighting 
( )1,0(!" ), and W  is the initial (pre-war) economic value associated with holding the land in a 
period such that the product Wi 1+!  is the economic value associated with holding the land in 
period 1,i j+ +  !  is Party A’s unit cost of obtaining a military good and allocating it to the 
disputed territory, and !  is Party B’s unit cost of obtaining a military good and allocating it to 
the disputed territory.  Additionally, the model assumes full depreciation of military goods with 
each period of fighting. 
 The specification of this model allows for various differences between the two rival 
parties, as well as differences in the nature of the disputed land.  We first note that a party’s 
probability of victory is a function of both that party’s military effectiveness and whether the 
party is defending or attacking.  The identity parameters !  and µ  allow for the possibility that 
military effectiveness differs across parties (! µ" ).  For example, in 1940, invading German 
forces used superior blitzkrieg tactics to overwhelm Allied forces in France ( µ! < ) despite the 
fact that military resources between the two sides were roughly equal (Bloch, 1940).  Unequal 
military effectiveness across contending parties was also observed during the Vietnam War- 
fought between a U.S./South Vietnam coalition and communist North Vietnam.  The U.S. 
coalition had larger and more powerful guns.  However, this did not clinch victory in part 
because of an inefficient use of military resources.  Examples of military ineffectiveness by the 
U.S. led coalition are listed as follows: professional hubris, excessive use of firepower, lavish 
base camps, hurtful personnel rotation policies, and corruption in the officer corps.  The North 
Vietnamese used guerrilla war tactics and were relatively more effective even while using 
inferior military technology (Record, 1996).  Clearly, this example emphasizes the fact that 
military effectiveness can differ across parties.  In this case, the North Vietnam army used a 
given unit of weaponry more effectively than did the U.S./South Vietnam coalition. 
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The defending party has a positional or strategic advantage shown by l  relative to .f   In 
the model, we assume that .f!l   In other words, ceteris paribus, it is never easier to capture a 
land than to successfully defend it.  Although the Texans were defeated, the Battle of the Alamo 
provides a clear example of how positional advantage can swing an additional benefit to the 
incumbent party.  In this case, the Texans held possession of the Alamo until Mexico began its 
assault.  Santa Anna attacked the Alamo with a roughly nine-to-one advantage in number of 
troops.  However, the Texans enjoyed higher elevation and were thus able to fire cannon shot 
down onto the invaders, greatly disorienting their opponents.  When the smoke settled, there 
were triple the number of casualties among Santa Anna’s men as among the Texans.  Without 
any positional advantage for the incumbent party, it is clear that Mexico would have had a much 
easier task in destroying the small band of men (Proctor, 1986). 
Two parties may also incur different costs in obtaining arms and delivering them to the 
disputed territory.  The cost parameters !  and !  could differ on account of an ally to one party 
subsidizing that party’s gun purchases, as the United States does Israel.  In this model, 
exogenous third parties can play decisive roles in how conflicts resolve.  “Allies” of either the 
attacking or defending party can increase military effectiveness or decrease the price of 
weaponry (Siqueira, 2003).  Such changes can swing power diametrically, as evidenced by the 
U.S. intervention in Cuba during the Spanish American War.
11
 
One party might value a disputed land for economic gains.  Saddam Hussein, for 
instance, took control of Kuwait in 1990 to increase Iraq’s wealth (Deese, 2005).  On the other 
hand, a party might also place a subjectively determined intrinsic value on a disputed territory.  
In the same conflict, Kuwait intrinsically valued the ability to self-rule, something they could 
regain through control of the disputed territory.  The above model considers the possibility of 
both types of valuation, as the 1990 attack on Kuwait suggests it should.  Note in the model’s 
structure that, in the absence of an exogenous shock, the intrinsic value a party places on holding 
the territory remains constant over the course of a conflict, whereas the economic value of 
holding the territory declines at a rate of ( !"1 ) per period.  Our model recognizes that war is 
physically destructive.  The value of land where war is fought will not increase, but rather 
diminish, as a result of war. 
Scenario 1: Party A effectively deters Party B (there is no war)  
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Beginning the analysis with Scenario 1, we examine the condition under which Party A 
(the territory’s defender) effectively deters Party B (the challenger), i.e., there is a “peaceful 
outcome” or no war.  We assume that Party A is a leader and Party B is a follower in a 
Stackelberg game.
12
 Consistent with backward induction, we first examine Party B’s optimal 
decision on arming. 
Starting from the initial period when ( ) 0,i j+ = the objective of Party B is to choose 
0,B
G  
that maximizes its expected payoff in the next period 
,1B
U (see (2b)).  The Kuhn-Tucker 
condition for Party B is:
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Equation (4) indicates that Party B finds it optimal not to waste resourc es in challenging Party A 
for the disputed land if A’s arming initially exceeds the critical level of 
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Equation (4) is therefore a sufficient condition for Party A to effectively deter Party B.  It is easy 
to verify the following co mparative statics:   
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Thus, it is more likely that Party B is deterred (i.e., it is more likely that Party A’s 
military defense allocation satisfies the deterrence condition), when (i) Party B’s intrinsic value 
for the disputed territory falls, (ii) the territory’s depreciable economic goods lose value more 
quickly, (iii) the total amount of economic value in the territory falls, (iv) Party B’s military 
effectiveness as challenger falls compared to that of Party A as defender, or (v) Party B’s unit 
cost of arming rises, ceteris paribus. 
Even if there is peace between the competing parties initially, exogenous changes to 
parametric values can lead to war.  Examples of peace off-setting exogenous shocks might be the 
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rise of a more capable leader who is able to improve Party B’s military effectiveness, the rise of 
a political party, political leader, or ideological movement which causes Party B to place more 
intrinsic value on the land, the improvement of Party B’s military transportation infrastructure, or 
Party B’s acquisition of an arms rich ally.  Conversely, shocks that adversely affect Party A’s 
parameters can also lead to Party B declaring war. 
Whenever ,0 ,0
ˆ
A A
G G< , Party A is not allocating enough resources to military defense to 
effectively deter the opposition and Party B finds it optimal to choose a positive offensive 
allocation.  In this case, war will occur. 
If Party B’s initial level of arming is positive ,0( 0),BG >  then B has a positive probability 
of defeating the initial leader of the territory.  Specifically, Party B’s optimal arming in period 
( ),i j+  in which a positive amount of 
,B i jG +  maximizes its expected payoff (see , 1B i jU + +  in (2b)), 
should satisfy the following necessary condition: 
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Solving for 
,B i jG +  yields  
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which defines Party B’s reaction function of arming.   
 Party A as the Stackelberg leader chooses a level of arming 
,A i jG +  that maximizes its 
expected payoff 
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, where 
,B i jG +  is given by 
the reaction function in (5).  Party A’s optimal arming 
,A i jG +  should satisfy the following 
necessary condition: 
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Using (5) and (6) to solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium levels of 
,A i jG +  and ,B i jG + , we have  
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From (7b), it follows that the necessary condition for * , 0B i jG + >  is that total valuation of 
the land to Party B, 1( ),i
B
V W! ++  exceeds that of the land to Party A, 1 ,i
A
V W! ++ modified by a 
weight (measured in terms of ,! ,!  and ).!   Alternatively put, the necessary condition for Party 
B to arm in order to challenge Party A for the land is that the ratio of Party A’s total valuation 
over that of Party B’s is relatively low such that  
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 If, instead, condition (8) fails to hold, then * , 0.B i jG + =   Under this circumstance, there is 
peace.  An alternative way to prevent war or create peace is through third-party intervention.  
Siqueira (2003) considers an interesting and prevalent intervention in terms of military subsidies 
provided by an intervening third-party to its ally.  In our model, such military subsidies to Party 
A as the defender, for example, can be captured by the parameter .!   This is consistent with the 
analysis of Siqueira (2003) in which third-party intervention is taken as exogenous.  It then 
follows from (7b) that  
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which can be interpreted as a “deterrence strategy” contributed by the third party.  A policy 
implication of this finding is straightforward.  If Party A obtains a weapon supply from a third 
party at a price low enough to satisfy the above condition, other things being equal, Party A will 
be able to deter Party B and hence there will be no war.
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 To analyze territorial dispute under the shadow of conflict, substituting * ,A i jG +  and 
*
,B i jG +  
from (7a) and (7b) into Party A’s probability of winning in (1) yields  
{ }*, ,min 1, ,A i j A i jP k+ +=  where 
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Based on the above analyses, we have  
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Proposition 1.  In the case of a territorial dispute in which Party A is a defender and Party B is 
its adversary, if the defending party holds more intrinsic value for the territory than its adversary 
(
A B
V V> ), the likelihood that combat occurs reduces as the nature of war becomes more 
destructive.  If physical conflict takes place, the equilibrium probability that Party A wins in a 
given period is increasing in Party B’s cost of arming, decreasing in Party A’s cost of arming, 
decreasing in the ratio of Party B’s offensive effectiveness to Party A’s defensive effectiveness, 
increasing in the amount by which Party A intrinsically values the land, and decreasing in the 
amount by which Party B intrinsically values the land.   
Proof: See A-2 in the Appendix. 
It becomes apparent that in the initial period, when ( ) 0,i j+ =  the necessary condition 
under which Party B arms itself in preparation for challenging Party A is as follows: 
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Whenever Party B initially attacks its opponent, Scenarios 2-5 comprise the set of 
possible outcomes.  In the subsequent analysis, we first discuss Scenario 2. 
Scenario 2: Party A eventually deters Party B  
This scenario examines the case in which the challenging party attacks the territory but at 
some point is deterred from further fighting without the land changing possession. 
In the case where Party A does not initially deter its opponent, A chooses the optimal 
defense allocation ( * ,A i jG + ) for each period ( )i j+  in which it holds the land according to 
equation (7a).  Using (7a) and (7b), we find that 
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      (10) 
When (10) holds, we can consider a particular outcome of the conflict during its first i 
periods (in which Party A controls the land).  We find that Party A increases its defense 
allocation with each ensuing period in which destruction occurs (i.e., the value of !  decreases), 
whereas Party B decreases its offensive allocation.  Thus, Scenario 2 is possible when inequality 
(10) is realized.  It is clear from the comparative static results that, in cases where there is a 
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prolonged attack on a disputed land, the conflict’s outcome becomes increasingly dependent 
upon the two parties’ relative intrinsic valuation of the territory. 
Proposition 2.  Assuming that ! <1 allows for the possibility that Party B can attack Party A 
and subsequently abandon all military involvement. 
Using (7a) and (7b), it is easy to verify that 
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           (11) 
When condition (11) obtains, Party A decreases its defense allocation with each ensuing round 
of conflict in which destruction occurs (i.e., the value of !  decreases), whereas Party B 
increases its offensive allocation.  When Party B has a relatively higher total valuation for the 
land, the probability that Party B takes the land increases with each round in which destruction 
occurs.  In the absence of a peace-inducing exogenous shock, Party B is less likely to be 
deterred.  Instead, Party B will be able to take the disputed territory at some point since * ,A i jG +  is 
decreasing, which lowers Party A’s probability of success, and * ,B i jG +  is increasing, which 
increases Party B’s probability of success. 
Scenario 3: Party B fights, takes the land, and deters Party A  
Note that for Party B to win and hence for Scenarios 3-5 to occur, the party must fight 
and defeat A at some point as just described.  After Party B takes possession of the land in period 
( 1),i j+ !  Party A can choose to attack or acquiesce in period ( ).i j+   The two sides will follow 
the same welfare-maximizing behavior as they did when Party A held the disputed land.  
However, the status parameter l  is now attached to Party B, while the status parameter f  is 
attached to Party A.  That is, the contest success functions of the two parties become 
,
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                   (12) 
where !  and µ , as defined earlier, are identity parameters for the military effectiveness of Party 
A and Party B, respectively, the status parameter l  is positional effectiveness of the defender 
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(Party B), and the status parameter f  is positional effectiveness of the attacker (Party A).  The 
CSFs in (12) can be rewritten as  
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where ( )
f!
"
µ
=
l
 represents a ratio comparing the overall (military and strategic) effectiveness 
of Party A in attacking the disputed territory to that of Party B in defending the disputed 
territory.
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We proceed to examine the third scenario, in which Party B wins and A is immediately 
deterred.  Using backward induction, we first examine Party A’s choice given that A has been 
defeated in period ( ).i j+   Party A’s objective function is  
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The Kuhn-Tucker condition for Party A is 
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Next, we discuss Party B’s first defense allocation.  Specifically, when Party B (now a 
Stackelberg leader) choose 
( )1
,
,
i
A
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V W
G
! "
#
+
+
+
=%  Party A is deterred from fighting to reclaim 
the land.  Note that Party B’s minimum defense allocation to deter Party A, 
,
,B i jG +
%  increases 
with !  and hence decreases with .fl  
 50 
For the case in which Party A arms such that 
,
0,A i jG + > Party B’s optimal choice of arming 
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It is easy to verify that party B’s optimal arming is  
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Substituting **,B i jG +  into Party A’s reaction function in (14a) yields  
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It follows from (15b) that Party A arms to challenge Party B, i.e., **, 0,A i jG + >  if and only if 
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 Equation (16) further implies that the necessary and sufficient condition under which 
party A chooses not to arm **,( 0)A i jG + = , and hence there is acquiescence, is  
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Intuitively, this is the circumstance in which the total valuation of the land to Party A is 
“critically low” such that 
1 11 ( )( ).
2
i i
A B
V W V W
!
" "
# $
+ +
+ % +   Thus, if Party B defeats Party A 
immediately after taking the disputed territory (Scenario 3), then condition (16) holds. 
Looking from the onset of the game, Scenario 3 is a possible outcome anytime Party B 
attempts to take power from Party A and inequality (16) is true.  Additionally, if Party B defeats 
A and inequality (16) is true, then Scenario 3 is certain.  The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for Scenario 3 are more likely to hold the larger is the ratio of Party A’s unit cost of arming to 
that of Party B’s ( !" ), the smaller is the ratio of Party A’s overall (military and strategic) 
effectiveness in attacking to that of Party B’s in defending (! ), and the larger is the ratio of 
Party B’s intrinsic valuation of the land compared to that of Party A’s (
AB
VV ).  Given the 
definition of ! , Scenario 3 is more likely to occur the large the defender’s (or leader’s) 
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positional effectiveness compared to that of the challenger (or follower), other things being 
equal.  This positional effect makes sense, as Party B must act in the role of challenger and 
possessor in order to take the land and effectively deter. 
Scenario 4: Party B fights, takes the land, and eventually Deters Party A 
Now we are in a position to examine Scenario 4, in which Party B as a challenger wins, 
fails to immediately deter Party A, but is able to eventually deter Party A from further fighting.  
The following describes briefly when Scenario 4 is possible, recognizing that Scenario 4 is 
essentially the opposite case to Scenario 2. 
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 for ( ) 0,..., 1,i j h j+ = + !       (17a)   
Party B will allocate a positive number of guns, and will have a positive probability of winning 
the land in each period of fighting.  Let us assume Party B takes the land in period 1.h j+ !  
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Party B does not effectively deter Party A immediately after taking the territory.   
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Party B moves toward deterrence after taking the land due to a similar result as that 
shown in inequality (10). 
 Let us further assume that Party B continues to hold the land during the thk  period 
( hk > ).  When both conditions (17b) and (17c) hold, the conflict moves toward a point in which 
1
1
2 ( ) 2,
i
B
i
A
V W
V W
! "
#
! $
+
+
+
% >
+
 that is, 
1
1
2( )( )( ) 2.
i
B
i
A
V W f
V W
! " #
! µ $
+
+
+
% >
+ l
  If this occurs, Party B has 
evolved into a position of deterrence, and the war will end.  For Scenario 4 to be possible, it 
must be true that ( )( ) 1,
f
! "
µ #
> $
l
 indicating that, for any conflict, the possibility of Scenario 2 
and that of Scenario 4 are mutually exclusive.  Scenario 4 is possible only in a conflict where the 
initial challenger faces disadvantages in arming cost and military effectiveness but enjoys a 
strong advantage in intrinsic valuation.  In such cases, it is possible for Party B, despite being at 
a tactical disadvantage, to take the land and eventually deter Party A.  Driven by a comparatively 
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large intrinsic value for the territory, Party B will optimally devote an increasingly larger amount 
of resources toward the conflict after taking the territory, while Party A decreases its defensive 
allocation over time.  If Party A fails to break Party B and retake the disputed land first, B will 
eventually force its rival challenger into acquiescence. 
Scenario 5: subsequent conflict (including the case where war is endless) 
Finally, we examine Scenario 5 in which there is subsequent conflict including the case 
when war is endless.  In the case that Party A retakes the territory, the conflict repeats itself.  The 
second repetition is different from the first only insomuch as prior fighting has depreciated the 
economic value of the land.   
There are two distinct outcomes within Scenario 5.  The first outcome is when neither party 
can “defeat and deter” its opponent (war is endless).  The second outcome is when one party 
“defeats and deters” its opponent (war ends). 
Conditions under which war is endless 
Recall that if Party A controls the territory, Party B continues to fight as long as 
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  Hence, fighting continues endlessly with the territory 
alternating stochastically in ownership if 
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Condition (18) requires 2 24 f<l  which, combined with the assumption that ,f>l  implies 
that 2 2 24f f< <l  or 2 .f f< <l   In other words, persistent conflict requires that the leader’s 
advantage to be bounded from above and below by the follower’s military capability.
19
  If these 
conditions obtain even as i  approaches ,!  then the war is endless (in absence of any exogenous 
shock).  We observe an important result from (18) as the following proposition illustrates: 
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Proposition 3.  When two parties have access to different technologies militarily for 
challenging and defending in territorial conflict, the likelihood of never-ending conflict with 
stochastic alternation of land ownership reduces, all other things held equal.  Nevertheless, 
conflict becomes more likely to persist indefinitely as the ratios of intrinsic values, relative cost 
of arming, relative strategic effectiveness, and relative effectiveness of military, independently 
approach one, ceteris paribus. 
To show Proposition 3, we note that inequality (18) reduces to 
1
2
2
f
R
f
< <
l
l
 if it is 
assumed that opposing parties have access to the same technology of conflict and face the same 
average costs of arming (! µ=  and ! "= ).  In this case, each side is defined militarily only by 
a status parameter rather than by both an identity parameter and a status parameter.  Given the 
inequality in (18), it becomes apparent that never-ending conflict with stochastic alternation of 
land ownership is less likely when the two sides have access to different technologies for 
conflict.   Therefore, it is clear that the “identical technology” assumption of Gershenson and 
Grossman (2000), when applied generally to territorial disputes, ignores a potentially crucial 
factor in the outcome of a particular conflict.    
Conditions under which war ends 
The value of R  changes with each additional round of fighting, and this can produce a 
situation where condition (18) no longer holds (conflict ends).  The essential comparative statics 
are as follows: 
0>
!
!
i
R
"
 when 1<R ; 0
i
R
!
"
=
"
 when 1=R ; 0<
!
!
i
R
"
 when 1>R . 
If R  changes over time to the extent that inequality (18) is no longer satisfied, the conflict 
will end.  Moreover, due to R’s monotonic movement over the course of a conflict, only the 
party that places more total value on the territory is capable of defeating and deterring its 
opponent once a conflict has reached Scenario 5.  Therefore, a “seemingly” endless conflict can 
end even in the absence of exogenous shock.  We thus have 
Proposition 4.  If conflict over a territorial dispute is to end, it may end more quickly 
(and will not end less quickly) as the nature of war becomes more destructive. 
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This proposition becomes apparent if we look again at inequality (18).  When 
A B
V V! , it 
is easy to show that the value for 
i
R
!
"
"
 deviates farther from zero as !  increases.  In other words, 
in a highly destructive conflict, relative land valuation changes more quickly.  This fact can 
cause highly destructive conflicts to be resolved more quickly, all other things held equal.  
However, a speedier conclusion to the conflict can occur through an exogenous shock.  For 
example, if Party A is suddenly able to obtain free weapons from an ally, this could potentially 
end the conflict.  
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Social scientists have observed that territorial disputes are the primary cause of war and 
that they can vary considerably in terms of duration and outcome.  In view of these observations, 
we develop a stylized game-theoretic model to characterize explicitly the outcome of a territorial 
dispute.  Our model concludes that the roots of variation in a conflict’s duration and outcome lie 
in how the two parties compare with respect to land valuation, military effectiveness, and cost of 
arming; as well as the degree of positional advantage, if any, the territory gives to its possessor 
and the rate at which the land’s economic value depreciates.  We conclude that land dispute 
between two similar parties will persist indefinitely, given that the controlling party does not 
enjoy a stark positional advantage.  Thus, conflict is more likely to end when opposing parties 
have access to different technologies for challenging political dominance, ceteris paribus.  We 
also find that, if a conflict is to end, a high rate of physical destruction may cause it to end more 
quickly (and will never cause it to end less quickly).  In yet another circumstance, the model 
reveals that, as the nature of war becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful 
outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the 
initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the land.  Lastly, assuming that war is 
(exogenously) destructive allows for the possibility that a challenging party can attack a 
defending party’s territory and subsequently abandon all military involvement.  Thus, both the 
degree to which access to technology differs across party and the (exogenous) level of 
destruction associated with the fighting, among other factors, help determine the duration and 
outcome of a conflict.   
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Following Siqueira (2003), our model harbors policy implications for third-party 
intervention for preventing war.  But the limitations of this paper, and hence possible extensions, 
should also be mentioned.  First, the paper does not feature an endogenous mechanism by which 
the two parties might peacefully negotiate.  Second, our analysis focuses on strategic interaction 
between rival parties in a myopic period-to-period framework without using a simultaneous 
multiple-period decision-making approach.  Interesting issues in such a multiple-period analysis 
include, among others, the optimal timing of launching a surprise attack and the conditions under 
which a territory’s defender can effectively deter a challenger.  Another possibility is to 
endogenize the role of a third party or an international institution in resolving territorial disputes.  
Lastly, one could consider a model in which foregone trade is treated as an opportunity cost of 
territorial dispute.  In such a framework, one might examine conditions under which trade can 
help to deter fighting.  Certainly, as European countries have opened markets since World War 
II, this opportunity cost has risen dramatically. 
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Appendix A - Footnotes for the “Fate of Disputed Territories.” 
1. Gershenson and Grossman (2000) develop an interesting model to characterize the 
nature of civil conflict. 
2.  In another example, when Argentina successfully took the Falkland Islands in 1982, 
this brief victory had no implications for relative military spending effectiveness, as the two 
parties did not have access to the same technologies for challenging and defending political 
dominance. 
3.  By exogenous destruction, we mean that level of damage in a conflict does not depend 
on level of guns. 
4. The term “peaceful outcome” means that there is no fighting.  In other words, the 
territory’s initial possessor is able to effectively deter the challenging party from attacking. 
5.  Gershenson and Grossman’s model does not allow for the possibility of this outcome. 
6. As in Gershenson and Grossman (2000), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and 
Grossman (2004), we consider a pure strategy equilibrium concept without using a mixed 
strategy approach. Garfinkel and Skaperdas further indicate that conflict is more likely to emerge 
when a party has the perception that the future matters. 
7.  For analyses of the nature of various forms of contest success functions, see, e.g., 
Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1989), and Skaperdas (1996). 
8.  The terms “military good” and “gun” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
9.  Note that *N  is defined as the set of non-negative integers. 
10. Note that, as other researchers before us, we take intrinsic and economic land 
valuation as given.  As stated by Gershenson and Grossman (2000), valuations “incorporate the 
possibility that one group might be willing and able to decrease the value of political dominance 
to the other group.”  They explain that this alteration may be achieved through promises from 
one group to the other, for instance. 
11.  U.S. help in the Spanish-American War both reduced unit arming cost and increased 
military effectiveness for the Cuban rebels (see, e.g., Pratt, 1995; and Convers, Alexander, and 
Levinson 1995; Stoner and  Luis 2005). 
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12.  We follow Grossman and Kim (1995), Gershenson and Grossman (2000), 
Gershenson (2002), and Stauvermann (2002) in utilizing a Stackelberg, or sequential-move, 
game framework in which the defender leads.  In particular, Gershenson (2002) defends this 
structure by assuming that the incumbent’s institutional framework is relatively rigid; therefore, 
defensive allocations constitute a commitment on the part of the incumbent.  The advantage of 
this assumption is that it allows for the analysis of a deterrent strategy on the part of the 
defender. 
13.  A-1 in the Appendix presents detailed derivations of the results for Scenario 1. 
14.  We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the model’s policy implications for 
peace through third-party intervention.  The referee further indicates that cost parameters !  and 
!  can be changed through arms boycotts, the presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces, 
and “no blood/conflict diamonds” publicity campaigns (for the cases of Angola, the Democratic 
Republic Congo, and Sierra Leone).  
15.  Condition (10) indicates that Party A’s intrinsic and economic value must be twice 
that of Party B’s.  This finding is consistent with the result of Gershenson and Grossman (2000), 
despite of their assumption that 0.! =   See A-3 in the Appendix for a detailed derivation of 
condition (10). 
16.  The sign of 
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 is ambiguous over the range 
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1
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i
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i
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+
 as the model is 
currently defined. 
17.  Note that ( )
f!
"
µ
=
l
 is not the inverse of  ( ),
fµ
!
"
=
l
 which implies that Scenario 3 
is not the reciprocal of Scenario 1.  This is because we consider not only a status parameter that 
captures relative military effectiveness of the parties, but also an identity parameter that 
characterizes relative strategic effectiveness of the parties. 
18.  See A-4 in the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the levels of arming by both 
Party A and Party B. 
19.  We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important requirement for the 
case of persistent conflict. 
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Appendix B - Derivations for “Fate of Disputed Territories” 
A-1. In the initial period 
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Thus the minimum defense allocation of Party A to deter Party B from arming and attacking is 
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If Party B  chooses to arm such that 
00, >BG
, then B has a positive probability of defeating the 
initial leader of the territory.  Party B’s optimal level of arming in period 
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positive should satisfy the following first -order condition  (FOC) : 
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Solving for 
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 yields  Party B’s reaction function of arming:  
   
1
, ,
,
( )
,
i
A i j B A i j
B i j
G V W G
G
"
!# !
+
+
+
+
= $
     (a.3)  
Party A as the Stackelberg leader chooses 
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where 
,B i jG +
 is given b y the reaction function in (a.3).  Party A’s FOC is    
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 Substituting (a.3) into (a.4), we solve for Party A’s optimal level of arming as follows: 
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Substituting 
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It follows from (a.6) that the necessary  condition for Party B to arm itself for possible  attack is 
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To determine Party A’s probability of winning, we substitute 
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It is straightforward  to derive the following derivatives:  
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Next, taking the derivative  of 
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It follows that
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A-4.  The FOC for Party A (as a Stackelberg follower) to arm is  
( )
( ), 1 , 12
,
, ,
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A i j A i j i
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Solving for 
,A i jG +
 yields  party A’s reaction function:  
   
( )1, ,
, .
i
B i j A B i j
A i j
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G
"
!# !
+
+ +
+
+
= %
     (a.7)  
The objective function of Party B (as a Stackelberg leader)  is  
, 1
, 1 , ,
, ,
( )( ) ,
B i j i
B i j B i j B B i j
B i j A i j
G
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!
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where 
,A i jG +
 is given by Party A’s rea ction function in (a.7 ).  The FOC for Party B is  
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  (a.8)  
Substituting (a.7) into (a.8), we solve for Party B’ s optimal level of arming as follows:  
( )
1 2
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, 2 1
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Substituting 
**
,B i jG +
 back into Part y A’s reaction function in (a.7 ) yields  
    
1 1 1
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Given that 
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!
µ
=
 
 we have 
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